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fforts to resolve political conflicts or
to counter political violence often
assume that adversaries make rational
choices (1). Ever since the end of the Second
World War, “rational actor” models have dom-
inated strategic thinking at all levels of gov-
ernment policy (2) and military planning (3).
In the confrontations between nation states,
and especially during the Cold War, these
models were arguably useful in anticipating
an array of challenges and in stabilizing world
peace enough to prevent nuclear war. Now,
however, we are witnessing “devoted actors”
such as suicide terrorists (4), who are willing
to make extreme sacrifices that are independ-
ent of, or all out of proportion to, likely
prospects of success. Nowhere is this issue
more pressing than in the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute (5). The reality of extreme behaviors
and intractability of political conflicts there
and discord elsewhere—in the Balkans,
Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and beyond—warrant
research into the nature and depth of commit-
ment to sacred values.
Sacred Values
Sacred values differ from material or instru-
mental ones by incorporating moral beliefs
that drive action in ways dissociated from
prospects for success. Across the world, peo-
ple believe that devotion to core values (such
as the welfare of their family and country or
their commitment to religion, honor, and jus-
tice) is, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable.
Such values outweigh other values, particu-
larly economic ones (6).
To say that sacred values are protected
from trade-offs with economic values does
not mean that they are immune from all mate-
rial considerations. Devotion to some core
values, such as children’s well-being (7) or the
good of the community (8), or even to a sense
of fairness (9), may represent universal re-
sponses to long-term evolutionary strategies
that go beyond short-term individual calcula-
tions of self-interest, yet advance individual
interests in the aggregate and long run. Other
such values are clearly specific to particular
societies and historical contingencies, such as
the sacred status of cows in Hindu culture or
the sacred status of Jerusalem in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. Sometimes, as with
cows (10) or forests (11), the sacred may repre-
sent accumulated material wisdom of genera-
tions in resisting individual urges to gain an
immediate advantage of meat or firewood for
the long-term benefits of renewable sources of
energy and sustenance. Political leaders often
appeal to sacred values as a way of reducing
“transaction costs” (12) in mobilizing their
constituents to action and as a least-cost
method of enforcing their policy goals (13).
Matters of principle or “sacred honor,”
when enforced to a degree far out of propor-
tion to any individual or immediate material
payoff, are often seen as defining “who we
are.” After the end of the Vietnam War, succes-
sive U.S. administrations resisted Hanoi’s
efforts at reconciliation until Hanoi accounted
for the fate of U.S. soldiers missing in action
(14). Granted, the issue was initially entwined
with rational considerations of balance of
power at the policy-making level: The United
States did not want to get too close to Hanoi
and so annoy Beijing (a more powerful strategic
ally against the Soviet Union). But popular
support for the administration’s position,
especially among veterans, was a heartfelt
concern for “our boys,” regardless of numbers
or economic consequences.
The “who we are” aspect is often hard for
members of different cultures to understand;
however, understanding and acknowledging
others’values may help to avoid or to resolve
the hardest of conflicts. For example, at the
peaceful implementation of the occupation of
Japan in 1945, the American government real-
ized that preserving, and even signaling
respect for, the emperor might lessen the like-
lihood that Japanese would fight to the death
to save him (15).
Symbolic Concessions
Our research team has measured emotional
outrage and propensity for violence in
response to peace deals involving com-
promises over issues integral to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict with Israeli settlers,
Palestinian refugees, and Hamas versus non-
Hamas students. Our proposed compromises
were exchanging land for peace, sovereignty
over Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian
refugees to return to their former lands and
homes inside Israel, and recognition of the
validity of the adversary’s own sacred values
(1). We found that the use of material incen-
Resolution of quarrels arising from conflicting
sacred values, as in the Middle East, may
require concessions that acknowledge the
opposition’s core concerns. 
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tives to promote the peaceful resolution of
political and cultural conflicts may backfire
when adversaries treat contested issues as
sacred values. Symbolic concessions of no
apparent material benefit may be key in help-
ing to solve seemingly intractable conflicts.
These results correspond to the historical
sense of experts. One senior member of the
National Security Council responded recently
(16), “This seems right. On the settlers [who
were to be removed from Gaza], Sharon real-
ized too late that he shouldn’t have berated
them about wasting Israel’s money and endan-
gering soldiers’lives. Sharon told me that he
realized now that he should have made a sym-
bolic concession and called them Zionist
heroes making yet another sacrifice.”
As further illustration that sacred values
can be at the heart of deep-seated political dis-
putes, Isaac Ben Israel, a former Israeli Air
Force general who currently heads his coun-
try’s space agency, told us: “Israel recognizes
that the [Hamas-led] Palestinian government
is still completely focused on what it considers
to be its essential principles. … For Hamas, a
refusal to utter the simple words ‘We recog-
nize Israel’s right to exist’is clearly an essen-
tial part of their core values. Why else would
they suffer the international boycott … and let
their own government workers go without pay,
their people go hungry, and their leaders
risk assassination?” Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas
leader and then-spokesman for the Palestinian
government, told us: “In principle, we have no
problem with a Palestinian state encompass-
ing all of our lands within the 1967 borders.
But let Israel apologize for our tragedy in
1948, and then we can talk about negotiating
over our right of return to historic Palestine.”
In rational-choice models of decision-
making, something as intangible as an apol-
ogy could not stand in the way of peace.
Apologies may not be so much deal-makers
in themselves as facilitators for political
compromise that may also involve material
transactions. At its founding in 1948, Israel
was in dire economic straits (17). But Israel
and the World Jewish Congress refused
to demand compensation directly from Ger-
many for the property of murdered European
Jews. Israel insisted that before any money
could be considered, Germany must publicly
declare contrition for the murder and suffering
of Jews at German hands.
An Iranian scholar and former top diplomat
remarked recently that “symbolic statements
are important if sincere, [and] without reser-
vation. In 2000, [then-Secretary of State
Madeleine] Albright seemed to apologize to
Iran for past offenses but then said [in a memo-
randum] ‘despite the trend towards democracy,
control over the military, judiciary, courts and
police remain in unelected hands.’Our leader-
ship interpreted this as a call for a coup” (18).
Recent Discussions
We went to the Middle East in February 2007
to directly probe issues of material trade-offs
and symbolic concessions with leaders of the
major parties to the Israel-Palestine dispute.
We asked 14 interviewees in Syria, Palestine,
and Israel to verify statements for citation. No
off-the-record statements contradicted these.
Responses were consistent with our previ-
ous findings (1), with one important differ-
ence. Previously, people with sacred values
had responded “No” to the proposed trade-off;
“No” accompanied by emotional outrage and
increased support for violence to the trade-off
coupled with a substantial and credible mate-
rial incentive; and “Yes, perhaps” to trade-offs
that also involve symbolic concessions (of no
material benefit) from the other side. Leaders
responded in the same way, except that the
symbolic concession was not enough in itself,
but only a necessary condition to opening seri-
ous negotiations involving material issues as
well. For example, Musa Abu Marzouk (for-
mer chairman, and current deputy chairman,
of Hamas) said “No” to a trade-off for peace
without granting a right of return; a more
emphatic “No, we do not sell ourselves for any
amount,” when given a trade-off with a sub-
stantial material incentive (credible offering
of substantial U.S. aid for the rebuilding of
Palestinian infrastructure); but “Yes, an apol-
ogy is important, but only as a beginning. It’s
not enough, because our houses and land were
taken away from us and something has to be
done about that.”
Similarly, Binyamin Netanyahu (former
Israeli prime minister and current opposition
leader in parliament) responded to our ques-
tion, “Would you seriously consider accepting
a two-state solution following the 1967 bor-
ders if all major Palestinian factions, includ-
ing Hamas, were to recognize the right of the
Jewish people to an independent state in
the region?” with the answer: “Yes, but the
Palestinians would have to show that they sin-
cerely mean it, change their textbooks and
anti-Semitic characterizations and then allow
some border adjustments so that Ben Gurion
[Airport] would be out of range of shoulder-
fired missiles.”
For Israel’s former chief hostage negotia-
tor, Ariel Merari, “Trusting the adversary’s
intentions is critical to negotiations, which
have no chance unless both sides believe the
other’s willingness to recognize its existential
concerns.” Indeed, recognition of some “exis-
tential values” may change other values into
material concerns, e.g., “since the PLO’s [Pale-
stine Liberation Organization’s] recognition
of Israel, most Israelis no longer see rule over
the West Bank as existential” (19).
We urgently need more scientific research
to inform better policy choices. Our findings
about sacred values suggest that there may be
fewer differences than are publicly acknowl-
edged in the material trade-offs that “moder-
ate” and “radical” leaders in Palestine, Israel,
and elsewhere may be willing to make.
Overcoming moral barriers to symbolic con-
cessions and their emotional underpinnings
may pose more of a challenge but also offer
greater opportunities for breakthroughs to
peace than hitherto realized.
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